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ANTITRUST LAWS AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW*
PHILIP MARCUSt
A right to know is a right to access to information and
ideas. While this right has not yet achieved constitutional
status, its importance in an operating democracy has been
increasingly acknowledged by sources with which judicial
decisions are not unacquainted.' It is the thesis of this
article that a right to know, by whatever name it is called,
is a legitimate concern of the antitrust laws.2
The media of communication of knowledge to be dealt
with are magazines and books, the theatre, newspapers, radio,
and motion pictures. Television is an increscent sixth. The
more complex our society grows, the more important it be-
comes that these avenues of information are generally avail-
able. The right to receive opinions is as important as the right
to utter them; the right to know facts is as important as the
right to disseminate them.2
* This is part of a study of the application of the antitrust laws
to civil rights which the writer hopes to develop in subsequent articles.
t B.A. 1929, Union, LL.B. 1932, Columbia.
1. "These rights of the people enconipass both the right freely to
transmit information and to express opinions and the right freely to
receive both from others." Winant, The Right of All People to Know,
35 SuRvuy GRAPHIC 431 (1946). The theme for the October 1948 National
Newspaper Week was, "Your Right to Know is the Key to All Your
Liberties." 81 EDIT. & PUB. 28 (Sept. 4, 1948). Article 19 of the
Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations appears to recognize a right to receive information. See
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 27 CAN. B. REV. 203, 208
(1949).
2. This article does not deal with restraints and monopolies affecting
the use of the equipment by which communications is effected. Some
of the perpetrators of restraints in this field have played similar roles
in other fields of communication. See Lord v. Radio Corporation of
America, 35 F.2d 962 (D. Del. 1929), aff'd, 47 F.2d 606 (3d Cir. 1931),
cert. denied 283 U. S. 847 (1931); United States v. Central-West Pub-
lishing Co., 1 D. & J. 359 (N. D. Ill. 1912); United States v. Motion
Picture Patents Co., 225 Fed. 800 (E. D. Pa. 1915); United States v.
Radio Corporation of America (D. Del. 1930); CCH, THE FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAWS 155 (1949); FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING, 5-20 (1941); ERNST, THE FIRST
FREEDOM, 194, 195 (1946); WHITE, THE AMERICAN RADIO, 32-33 (1947).
The Government has recently brought an antitrust action against the
American Telephone and Telegraph Company in which the primary
charge is monopolization and restraint of equipment, United States v.
Western Electric Co. (Civ. Action No. 17-49, D. N. J. 1949).
3. See COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RE-
SPONSiLE PRESS, 17 (1946); CHAFFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COM-
MUNICATIONS, 546 (1947); WHITE, op. cit. supra note 2 at 248, quotes
the following from a 1939 Code Manual: "Let it be remembered that
American Radio is predicated upon the right of the listener to hear,
not upon the right of an individual to be heard."
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Deliberate distortion or suppression of facts and opinion
may be the price we are willing to pay for a press which is
free to accept or reject government handouts and free to
criticize what it does not like. But that price is bearable
only if access to multiple avenues of information permits
an evaluation of truth or falsehoods, right or wrong. It has
been said that, "In a free society there is faith in the ability
of the people to make sound rational judgments. But such
judgments are possible only where the people have access
to all revelant facts and to all prevailing interpretations of
the facts."'4  Elsewhere, it has been asserted :r
. . . often overlooked, is the threat to freedom inherent in
combinations of private economic power that gain control over
large segments of the press, the radio, or other media. Private
monopoly or semimonopoly can restrict the right of the people
to know just as surely as government monopoly.6 The old
saying that, 'all power corrupts; absolute power corrupts ab-
solutely' applies here, too.
'It is necessary that competition in the expression of ideas
and in the transmittal of information be kept economically pos-
sible, as well as legally possible, if it is to exist.
One of the striking and disturbing factors about re-
straints and monopolies in media of communication is that
the controlling hands of one medium continue to reach into
other and newer media.7 The pattern, generally, is to at-
4. THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
8 (1947).
5. Winant, supra note 1, at 432.
6. Compare: "Last winter, the American Press Association repre-
senting 4,000 small dailies and weeklies, obtained from the strike bound
steel industry a huge order of policy advertising. The A. P. A. followed
up the orders with letters to 1,400 publishers:
We are counting on you to give us all the support that
your judgment dictates. This is your chance to show the steel
people what the rural press can do for them. Go to it, and
pave the way for more national advertising.
Christman, Nobly Save or Meanly Lose, 35, SURVEY GRAPHIC 436, 440
(1946). COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, Op. cit. supra note 2
at 62-63.
7. See ERNST, op. cit. supra note 2 at 170; Time, May 24, 1948,
p. 72-77. Variety, April 7, 1948, p. 28, reported that, "Westinghouse
Electric, which helped form the basis of NBC's radio web by linking
its pioneer AM stations to the NBC network, is finally following
through in the web's television plans. NBC has arranged to bring
the outfit in on a pool arrangement with Philco in operation of WPTZ,
Philco-owned station in Philadelphia. Working agreement, which has
tied WPTZ to the NBC east coast video web for the last two years,
expires next month. Westinghouse will be brought in at that time on
the assumption of both NBC and Philco that it's better for a big-league
AM Station, such as Westinghouse's KYW in Philly, to segue into
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tempt to retard the development of the newer medium and
when the medium shows signs of permanence, to become im-
portant factors in the ownership and operation of that
medium. In 1949 the Federal Communications Commission
created quite a stir by announcing it was considering the
qualifications of motion picture companies as prospective
television licensees in the light of their antitrust8 background.
State antitrust acts will sometimes be applicable to these
media," and it is one purpose of this article to show that the
Sherman Act can and should be applied in this field. The
media we have mentioned [magazines and books, the theatre,
newspapers, radio, motion pictures, and television] are all
constant travelers across state and national lines. All of
them and many of their individual components affect sub-
stantially interstate and inter-national commerce. They set
into motion innumerable interstate and foreign transactions.
Story, article, news, comment, advertisement, all parts
of these media, undoubtedly occasion the majority of all in-
terstate transactions. The incalculable influence of these
media upon the public make it all the more important that
competitive avenues of information not only between but
within media exist, so that we may have the opportunity to
formulate our opinions and guide our lives upon the basis
of an informed selective knowledge.
BOOKS AND MAGAZINES
We hear more of restraints in book selling via Fair
video than for an outfit like Philco, with no AM experience, to try to
go it alone." As to motion picture companies going into television, see
Variety, April 28, 1948, pp. 1, 26, 61. In Re Georgia School of Tech-
nology, 10 F. C. C. 109 (1943).
8. On this basis the Federal Communications Commission, at the
time of this writing, was holding up applications of Fox, Paramount,
and Warner, adjudicated in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
334 U. S. 131 (1948) to have violated the antitrust laws, and the Schine
Circuit, adjudicated in Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334
U. S. 110 (1948) to have run afoul of the Sherman Act. See Federal
Communication Commission Public Notice No. 32128, Feb. 10, 1949;
Film Daily, Jan. 28, 1949, p. 1; and following issues of this and other
trade magazines. As to congressional interest in this problem see The
Independent Film Journal, March 26, 1949, pp. 8, 11.
9. In a number of states, antitrust statutes are as broad as the
Sherman Act. Hearings before Senate ubcommittee of Committee on
Interstate Commerce, on S. 1973 81st Cong. 1st Sess. (June 16, 17,
1949). Note, A Collection and Survey of State Anti-trust Laws, 32
COL. L. REv. 347 (1932); Note, 43 ILL. L. REv. 205 (1948).
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Trade Act proceedings than along traditional antitrust lines.10
But antitrust laws have been applied to book publishers from
time to time. In the early days of this century, the pub-
lishers, through two associations, attempted to monopolize
book publishing and book selling as well as to fix and main-
tain prices on books." In more recent years, concert of
action to use the Fair Trade Acts for the same purpose has
been charged.12 Law book publishers have been found guilty
of violating the antitrust laws. 18
There are many different magazines in this country,
but it is said that there are five publishing companies which
dominate the magazine field. 4 Restraints in this field some-
times crop up.1 5 A Catholic group, known as the National
Office for Decent Literature, is said not only to have black-
listed a number of periodicals, but as a pressure group, to
have driven a substantial number of magazines out of exist-
ence. 6 Regulations and restrictions of this sort by private
groups, based upon subjective evaluations, not only of moral
issues but of social and economic matters, would seem to be
unlawful restraints of trade.
THE THEATRE
Restraints within the ambit of the antitrust laws have
10. It has been said that in most respects, at present, books are
the least hampered of the accepted means of communication. Melcher,
Freedom to Read: Books, 35 SuRvny GRAPHIC 457 (1946). As to priVate
and government censorship of plays and books, see CHAFFEE, FRE
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES, 537 et seq. (1941).
11. The Sherman Act was held applicable in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus, 139 Fed. 155 (S. D. N. Y. 1905), aff'd on other grounds, 210
U. S. 339 (1908).
12. See Schill v. Remington-Putnam, 182 Md. 153, 31 A.2d 467, 32
A.2d 296 (1943). The complaint charged that since 1937 practically
all current trade books were price fixed in New York under agree-
ments for retailers to observe fixed prices and that a joint enforce-
ment committee existed to carry out the price fixing agreements.
13. Callaghan & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 163 F.2d 359(2d Cir. 1947).
14. See Miller, Freedom to Read: Magazines, 35 SuRvny GRAPmC
462, 463 (1946).
15. As far back as 1911, the Government brought suit against an
alleged magazine trust, but the complaint was dismissed in 1913.
United States v. Periodical Clearing House, 1 D & J 287 (S. D. N. Y.
1913). The Saturday Evening Post has been charged with using its
advertising power to restrict- the placing of avertisements in other
periodicals. Blumenstock Bros. v. Curtis Pub. Co., 252 U. S. 436
(1920).
16. Blanshard, The Catholic Church as Censor, 166 NATION 459,
462 (1948).
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not been uncommon in the entertainment field.17 Shakes-
peare followers have not always kept in mind that "the play
is the thing." Sometimes, the antitrust stage has been oc-
cupied by the theatre operators, sometimes by the writers
and dramatists, and sometimes by that most unusual player,
the audience.'8
In this country the courts, when first confronted with
restraints and monopolies in this field, found it difficult to
find commerce, trade or interstate commerce, 19 despite the
obvious substantial interstate transactions in producing plays
and stage acts in different parts of the country by the same
or different actors. Agreements by theatre circuits not to
produce attractions controlled by rival Interests, and to play
only attractions which were under agreement not to be shown
in rival theatres, were alleged over forty years ago.20
Restrictions in this field probably would be found to
come within the antitrust laws.2 1 It has been thought that
the production of a play could be interstate commerce under
the Sherman Act so as to reach a broad plan by authors to
17. Finley v. Music Corporation of America, 66 F. Supp. 569 (S.
D. Cal. 1946) (name bands engaged in commercial ballroom dance
halls. There has been a continuing, confusing series of antitrust
battles with respect to the activities of the American Society of Com-
posers, Authors and Publishers); United States v. American Society
of Composers, Authors and Publishers (S. D. N. Y. Eq. No. 78-388
1934); United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors &
Publishers (E. D. Wis. Cr. No. 444-Q 1941) (plea of nolo contendere,
fine of $35,250); United States v. American Society of Composers,
Authors & Publishers (S. D. N. Y. Civil N. 13-95 1941) (consent
decree); United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors &
Publishers (S. D. N. Y. Civil No. 42-245 1946) (pending). Alden-
Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soc. of Composers, 79 F. Supp. 315 (S. D.
N. Y. 1948); N. Whitmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843 (D.
Minn. 1948).
See also, Hotel Edison Corp. v. Taylor, 185 Misc. 681, 58 N. Y.
Supp. 146 (1944), aff'd, 268 App. Div. 1029, 295 N. Y. 581 (1945).
18. In this field, there is an unofficial censorship organization
known as the Catholic Theatre Movement, but it does not appear to
have attained the significance of similar groups in the motion picture
field, Blanshard, Ronman Catholic Censorship, 166 NATION 499, 501-502(1948).
19. See Hart v. B. E. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 12 F.2d 341 (2d
Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 703, 704 (1926).
20. People v. Klaw, 55 Misc. 72, 106 N. Y. Supp. 341 (Ct. Gen.
Sess. 1907). As to early restrictions to prevent actors from playing
in motion pictures, see Variety, April 6, 1949, p. 20.
21. It has been reported that the Antitrust Division of the De-
partment of Justice has been investigating booking of legitimate shows
concentrating "on the United Booking Office-Shubert set-up." Variety,
April 20, 1949, p. 50.
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control dramatic productions of the country.22  In fact, re-
strictions within this field have been held to be within the
New York Antitrust Act.2
Theatre owners have sometimes reacted violently to criti-
cism. The well known Alexander Woollcott criticized a play
produced by the no less well known Mr. Shubert. Thereupon,
Shubert and others excluded him from one theatre and
threatened to exclude him from another. This same Mr.
Shubert, some six years before the Woollcott affair, had been
thrown out of a theatre by Ziegfeld and others causing him
to "suffer great mortification of mind and feelings." Shu-
bert's attempt to sue under the state's Civil Rights Statute2 4
was as unsuccessful as the similar suit by Woollcott.2 5 Anti-
trust action might have been more rewarding.
THE PRESS
To allow the press to be "fettered is to fetter ourselves. '2 6
While we may take pride in the freedom of our press from
government shackles, it is hardly the emotion to be evoked
by the fetters imposed upon the press by its own members.
Monopoly by newspapers has been steadily on the riseY.2
It has been noted by many and has been the occasion for
22. Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1944) (basic agreement
of the Dramatists Guild of the Authors League of America, Inc., con-
tained provisions for price fixing and compulsory arbitration, also
forbade outright sale of television, radio, and other subsidiary rights
except with Guild's permission). The court thought this was prima facie
bad. Recently, it was announced that the Dramatists Guild Council
had fixed minimum play royalties for the 1948 season. See Variety,
April 7, 1948, p. 56. It is difficult to see how this form of price
fixing can escape the antitrust laws. The Minimum Basic Agreement
of the Guild has recently been held illegal and its enforcement en-joined. Ring v. Spina, 84 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
23. Dunkel v. McDonald, 57 N. Y. S.2d 211 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1945),
modif., 270 App. Div. 757, 59 N. Y. S.2d 921 (1946). See also same
case on question of damages, 272 App.Div. 267, 70 N. Y. S.2d 653(1947) (association in theatrical industry provided members should
work only with other members, and required that contracts made by
members with producers provide that all work in the specified arts
and trades required by the producer be performed only by their mem-
bers).
24. Shubert v. Nixon Amusement Co., 83 N. J. 101, 83 Ati. 369(1912).
25. Woollcott v. Shubert, 217 N. Y. 212, 111 N. E. 829 (1916).
26. Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U. S. 233, 250 (1936).
27. See ERNST, op. cit. .supra note 2, Ch. IV, and pp. 279-280 (1946).
It has been asserted that 1,000 dailies and 3 000 weeklies have been lost
here in the last few decades. Ernst, Why Not a First Freedom Treaty,
35 SURVEY GRAPHIC 445, 446 (1946).
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expression of concern by some.2 8  It has been said that six
chains account for one fourth of the total newspaper circu-
lation in this country.29 Monopoly of the press in terms of
a single management exists in ninety per cent of the com-
munities where newspapers are published; in the United
States only one city out of twelve has a competing news-
paper. Almost 1300 cities have no competitive newspapers,
and this is true in approximately one half of cities of 100,000
or greater population. 0 In ten states there are no cities
which have newspaper competition;3 in twenty-two states
there is no Sunday newspaper competition ;32 and in this
country of many cities, only some 117 continue to have com-
peting newspaper ownership.3 Monopolies of this sort have
a volcanic base from which are wont to come disquieting
eruptions.
The Associated Press has an unenviable history of mo-
nopoly and restraint.34  Due to Illinois' condemnation of its
monopolistic activities,35 the Associated Press moved to be
incorporated in New York. When its monopolistic practices
were subsequently condemned by the Supreme Court,36 a
number of its members endeavored to have a bill passed
which would exempt the Association from the Sherman Act.
Freedom of the press, a shibboleth invoked by the As-
sociated Press in an unsuccessful attempt to avoid the appli-
'cation of the Sherman Act, has itself been protected by that
Act. Strangely enough, in a striking instance it was that
28. See Winant, The Right of All People to Know, 35 SURVEY
GRAPHIC 431, 432 (1946).
29. Stewart, Freedom to Read: Newspapers, 35 SURVEY GRAPHIC
452, 453 (1946). 14 newspaper owners are said to control 25 per cent of
the daily circulation. THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE
AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS, 47 (1947). The percentage has been estimated
to be one-third. ERNST, THE FIRST FREEDOM, 74 (1946). As to mass
block booking of contents and advertisements of weeklies, see ERNST,
supra, pp. 108-109.
30. Nixon, Comentration and Absenteeism in Daily Newspaper
Ownership, 22 Journalism Q. 97, 100 (1945). Editor and Publisher
Yearbook 103 (1945). See also Editor and Publisher International
Yearbook 18 (1948).
31. ERNST, op. cit. supra note 2, at 69.
32. Nixon, supra note 80, at 117.
33. ERNST, op. cit. supra note 2, at 446.
34. See ERNST, op. cit. supra note 2, at 81-89.
35. Inter-Ocean Pub. Co. v. Associated Press, 184 Ill. 438, 56 N. E.
822 (1900).
36. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1 (1945).
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none too valiant a supporter of civil liberties, the Hearst
Press, which invoked the Sherman Act. During the first
world war there was created under state law the Council of
Defense of the State of New Mexico. This Council was, to
put it mildly, not an admirer of Hearst. It caused to be
printed and circulated, among other things, the following
statements in the New Mexico War News:
The Council of Defense calls upon every loyal, patriotic citizen
of New Mexico not only to quit asking for the Hearst publica-
tion at the newsdealers, but to stop taking them on subscrip-
tion, and to stop reading them. In other words, to say to Herr
Wilhelm von Hearst, the Hearst publications, and Hearstism in
general: "Good Night" . . . Governor Lindsey and Attorney
General Patton approve and indorse this move to rid the -state
of Hearst publications and Hearstism.
The Council thought so well of their idea that they advised
other State Defense Councils of what they were doing.
Hearst's New Mexican hair shirt was made more irritating
by publication in the New Mexico War News of an Honor
Roll consisting of names of concerns which had ceased to
sell Hearst publications. Hearst's corporation brought an in-
junctive action under the Sherman Act and the New Mexican
Antitrust statute. Among the defenses raised was that the
Council's action was state action, and that they were within
their federal and constitutional rights as to freedom of
speech. The court found their actions were not authorized
by the statutes creating them or by the informal approval
of the governor. The court said that their second contention
was answered by Gompers v. Buck Stove Co.,37 and that the
Sherman Act applied. The court was impressed by the ef-
fect of defendant's activities on Hearst magazines in which
nothing offensive was shown to have appeared.3 8
In other instances, also, the press has received aid from
the Sherman Act.39 However, the right of an individual
37. 221 U. S. 418 (1911).
38. Council of Defense v. International Magazine Co., 267 Fed. 391(8th Cir. 1920)-plaintiff's publications were magazines. This same
court some three years later found no Sherman Act violation in the
boycott of and defamation campaign of another newspaper, after stating
the Act was aimed at large accumulations of capital. Konecky v. Jewish
Press, 288 Fed. 179 (8th Cir. 1923).
39. In United States v. Retail Dry Goods Ass'n (S. D. N. Y. 1943),
Antitrust Blue Book, No. 772 (1947), the defendant and 15 New York
City department stores were charged with agreeing to withdraw ad-
vertising from the Now York Times unless an announced increase in
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newsdealer, who did not like Hearst's newspapers during
World War I, to refuse to carry Hearst papers, was pro-
tected against a concert of action by the other newspapers
in New York City through their association and a newspaper
distributor, to refuse to sell him other New York papers un-
less he carried those of Hearst.40
An advertising practice which kills off many small
papers is that of a large newspaper declining to take a
smaller advertisement from an advertiser than that given to
the smaller paper.4 1 The Chattanooga News-Free Press Co.
was found guilty of conspiring to restrin and attempting to
monopoloize interstate commerce by preventing the operation
of competing afternoon newspapers in Chattanooga, one de-
vice being exclusive advertising contracts. 42  A newspaper
publisher of the only daily newspaper in Lorain and Mans-
field, Ohio, in the early part of last year was denied a radio
franchise by the Federal Communications Commission, be-
cause of his using the power of his newspaper as a necessary
advertising medium to restrict the competition of a radio
station in Mansfield. 43  This practice by the Lorain pub-
lisher has subjected him to a suit under the Sherman Act.431
It is sometimes said that newspapers are dependent upon
their advertisers. However, it is equally likely that busi-
nessmen are dependent upon their ability to advertise in
newspapers. Restraints such as those involved in the Mans-
field, Ohio case would clearly appear to be within the
advertising rates was cancelled. The defendants pleaded nolo contendere
and were fined $80,000. In 1948, an antitrust suit was brought in the
District of Columbia charging a merchants' association and several of
the largest department stores in the city with boycotting and blacklisting
a monthly newspaper. Apparently, there is considerable concert of
action in placing advertising. See District of Columbia Citizen Pub-
lishing Co. v. Merchant & Mfgrs. Ass'n. (D.C. 1949) CCH P. 62, 439.
40. Sultan v. Star Co., 106 Misc. 43, 174 N. Y. Supp, 52 (Sup. Ct.
N. Y. 1919). The court rejected the justification that newspapers could
thus band together [to prevent discrimination against one of them].
41. ERNST, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 102.
42. United States v. Chattanooga News-Fr~e Press Co. (E. D. Tenn.,
Cr. No. 7978 1040).
43. In re Application of Fostoria Broadcasting Co., 3 PIKE &
FISCHER (RADIO REGULATION) § 53:24 (1948): "The Newspaper does not
carry the station's program logs and will not publish any news stories
relating to the station or its personnel unless they are unfavorable."
There was testimony that advertisers' contracts were cancelled when.
they began to advertise over station WMAN.
43a. United States v. The Lorain Journal (N. D. Ohio Sept. 22,
1949).
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Sherman Act. Undoubtedly, advertising by national dis-
tributors and advertising by local merchants of products
coming from without the state were restricted. The direct
result of such restrictions is a restraint upon the free flow
of such goods from outside the state and an unreasonable
restriction on the right to do business within the state. With
this background, an exclusive contract might fall within the
Sherman Act, 44 as would conspiracy between the publisher
and his two newspaper companies.45
Restrictions upon the right to read have been imposed
upon the public by agreements between newspapers and be-
tween them and newsdealers.4 6
It has been said that the United Press probably would
favor a government suit against it so that it could get out of
existing contracts under which it is bound to refund part or
all of the excess fee to original subscribers in various areas
when other papers in the area subscribe to the U. P. service.4 7
In the light of the adjudicated cases, it may be doubted that
U. P. need wait for government intervention to repudiate
these contracts.
These activities would seem to be within the Sherman
Act and appropriate state acts ;48 the monopoly status may
well be vulnerable to antitrust action. "The publisher of a
newspaper has no special immunity from the application of
general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the
rights and liberties of others. . . . He is subject to the
44. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U. S. 218 (1947). But see
United States v. Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495 (1948).
45. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U. S. 110
(1948).
46. Langley v. Furman, 132 Misc. 726, 230 N. Y. Supp. 538 (Sup.
Ct. N. Y. 1928) (suit to enjoin defendants from refusing to sell news-
papers, periodicals, etc. to plaintiff who had a newsstand); Finnegan v.
Butler, 112 Misc. 280, 182 N. Y. Supp. 671 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1920)
(Buffalo Publishers Association meetings discussed prices of news-
papers: all except one newspaper increased their price to two cents).
Newsdealers informed they would not be sold the other newspapers if
they handled the recalcitrant Buffalo Commercial. Held, prima facie
conspiracy. See also Sultan v. Star Co., 106 Misc., 43, 174 N. Y. Supp.
52 (1919). As to restriction on access by the public to newspapers
because of newsstand fights, see THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 48-49.
47. ERNST, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 88.
48. In Wisconsin, newspapers are expressly included within the
state's antitrust laws. Wisc. Stats. § 133.01 (1947). In the Mansfield
case, supra note 43, the effect on interstate commerce of the restraint
imposed was emphasized by the inability of a Philco (a well known
national firm) representative to place an ad in the paper.
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antitrust laws." 49 Restricting access to a great newsgather-
ing agency in order to protect a member from competition
has been held to come within the Sherman Act.50 It is well
established that the newspaper industry is within the reach
of the Sherman Act,51 and that the Act reaches monopolies
as well as trade restraints.52
Freedom of the press is not merely freedom to the
owners of the press; of equal importance is the right of the
public to be free to receive the news.5 3  It is only by cross-
lights from varying directions that full illumination can be
secured.54 However simple to follow is a single voice, a
49. Associated ]press v. N. L. R. B., 301 U. S. 103, 132 (1937).
50. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1 (1945). But
the court refused to condemn an exclusive contract between Associated
Press and local newspapers under which news originating from the
latter went to Associated Press. In Chamber of Commerce v. Federal
Trade Commission, 13 F.2d 673, 687-688 (8th Cir. 1926), the court
refused to make an antitrust violater cause its newspaper to throw
open its daily market quotations to all. Cf. United States v. New
England Fish Exchange, 258 Fed. 732, 748 (D. Mass. 1919) (court re-
quired Exchange to be thrown open to outside dealers under reasonable
regulations).
51. See Note, Press Associations and Restraint of Trade, 55 YALE
L. J. 428 (1946). Cf. Note, Newsgathering Monopolies and the Anti-
trust Act, 36 GEo. L. J. 66 (1947). In Inter-Ocean Pub. Co. v. Asso-
ciated Press, 184 Ill. 438, 56 N. E. 822 (1900), it appeared that the
bylaws and contracts of the Association provided that the recipient of
news should not receive news from any other corporation which the
directors of Associated Press should declare antagonistic to it. Held,
void as creating a monopoly.
52. 26 Stat. 109, 15 U. S. C. A. § 2 (1940). The acquisition by
the Philadelphia Bulletin in 1947 of the only competing morning news-
paper in Philadelphia led to an investigation by the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice.
53. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 143 (1943). In
U. S. v. Associated Press, 52 F.2d 362, 372 (S. D. N. Y. 1943), aff'd,
326 U. S. 1 (1945), an antitrust case, Judge Learned Hand pointed
out that ". . . However, neither exclusively, nor even primarily, are the
interests of the newspaper industry conclusive; for that industry serves
one of the most vital of all general interests; the dissemination of news
from as many different sources, and with as many different facets and
colors as is possible. That interest is closely akin to, if indeed it is not
the same as, the interest protected by the First Amendment; it pre-
sunposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of
a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selec-
tion. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked
upon it our all."
54. U. S. v. Associated Press, supra note 53. When this case
reached the Supreme Court, Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion
said: "But the freedom of enterprise protected by the Sherman Law
necessarily has different aspects in relation to the press than in the
case of ordinary commercial pursuits. The interest of the public is to
have the flow of news not trammelled by the combined self-interest of
those who enjoy a unique constitutfional position precisely because of
the public dependence on a free press. A public interest so essential
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single voice is not the way in which a democracy expresses
itself. 55 Whether the result is by design or natural economic
forces, we cannot view with equanimity the compression of
voices, whether of the press, air, or screen, into a narrowing
number.56 One effect of such concentration is an enforced ig-
norance of the public of the restraints and monopolies which
exist in this medium of communication, because the press
owners have generally avoided such a subject.
Some members of the press have been troubled over the
growing monopoly status of newspaper operations in par-
ticular localities.5 7  Others point out that many newspapers
have been sold or ceased to exist because of lack of financial
success. It has been urged that monopoly status creates an
added sense of responsibility, but there is little doubt that
such a status creates a real danger to the public.' s While
to the vitality of our democratic government may be defeated by private
restraints no less than by public censorship." 326 U. S. 1, 28-29 (1945).
55. In Inter-Ocean Pub. Co. v. Associated Press, 184 Ill. 438, 453,
56 N. E. 822, 826 (1900), the court said: "To enforce the provisions
of the contract and this bylaw would enable the appellee to designate
the character of the news that should be published, and, whether true
or false, there could be no check on it by publishing from other sources.
Appellee would be powerful in the creation of a monopoly in its favor,
and could dictate the character of news it would furnish, and could
prejudice the interests of the public." Of the giants of the press, it
has been said: "Their control over the various ways of reaching the
ear of America is such that, if they do not publish ideas which differ
from their own, those ideas will never reach the ear of America." COM-
MISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 24.
56. Monopoly may actually deprive a community of newspapers to
read, as in Springfield, Mass., where the single publisher of all news-
papers refused to enter into a contract with the printers. See Time,
March 10, 1947, pp. 59-60. The presence of two differently owned news-
papers in one city does not necessarily make for divergence of approach
on basic issues, since the similarity in point of view of the publishers
is more pronounced than dissimilarity. See Bergman, Rivals in Con-
fo'rmity: A Study of Two Competing Dailies, 25 JouRNALishI Q. 127
(1948).
57. See Edit. and Pub. March 26, 1949, pp. 5 et seq.
58. At a panel discussion attended by editors of several large news-
papers and members of the Commission on Freedom of the Press, Dr.
Niebuhr was of the opinion that, because of such status, competition
was "no longer a genuine source of discipline in quality." Id. at 6. Ad-
mission by some of the members of the panel that many newspapers
had gone overboard on a recent political event and had largely ignored
another political problem, id. pp. 5 et seq., illustrates the danger to the
public in places where monopoly status exists.
It appears that in 1949 more successful theatrical productions were
preferring to play in Minneapolis than in the neighboring city of St.
Paul. It is said that, "in 'reprisal,' the two St. Paul newspapers,
owned by B. H. Ridder and his family, continue to refuse to carry any
advertising for those attractions which confine their Twin City engage-
ments to Minneapolis. They also omit all mention of the shows in their
news columns in the hope that St. Paul residents won't be aware of their
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definitely not a complete answer, it would seem that before
one newspaper in a city could acquire a competing news-
paper, an opportunity should be afforded others to acquire
the paper.
RADIO
Newipaper publishers have not welcomed the advent
of a rival means of communication. Radio has been and is
being opposed by the press in ways to which the antitrust
laws would seem applicable5 9 In 1922, the Associated Press
warned its members that broadcasting of its news was
against its bylaws; by 1933, the American Association of
Newspaper Publishers had persuaded the three major news
service agencies to suspend the service of news to broad-
casters. When the Columbia Broadcasting System began to
organize its own newsgathering staff, newspapers in the
areas where the Columbia Broadcasting System had outlets
withdrew program listings. Representatives of the two major
networks, of the American Association of Newspaper Pub-
lishers, Associated Press, United Press, are said to have then
met and entered into an agreement severely restricting the
networks in the broadcasting of news.60
Many of these restrictions have disappeared, but others
have taken their place. It has been alleged that Station
WMRC, in Greenville, South Carolina, was kept by the local
newspaper from securing any news service until it had sold
a large interest in the station to Roger C. Peace of that
paper.68  Similarly, the Des Moines Register and Tribune
and its three radio stations have been charged with using
their influence to restrict the news supply of station WHO
for a number of years.2 Last year, it was reported that
presence 10 miles or less distance or will refuse to attend them."
Variety, April 6, 1949, p. 56. This example serves to illustrate how
monopoly power can and does deny to the public news of current events.
59. See WHITE, THE AMERICAN RADIO, 44 et seq. (1947). ERNST,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 152 (1946). As to opposition by the movies, see
WHITE, supra, 43. Competition in the early days of broadcasting was
retarded by A. T. & T.'s policy, "to decline to furnish telephone net-
work service to broadcasting stations which were not licensed under
the Telephone Co.'s patents and to limit in various ways wire service
supplied to licensed stations." FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING, 7 (1941).
60. See ERNST, op. cit. supra note 2, at 152. This was the era of
the exhortation: "See your local newspaper for further details."
61. See ERNST, op. cit. supra note 2, at 156-157.
62. ERNST, op. cit. supra note 2, at 155. Bergman, Rivals in Con-
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"Editors of the three Cleveland dailies have advised the local
newspaper guild that they propose to maintain the same com-
mon front against television they have always had against
radio."' 3 The power of newspapers to keep knowledge from
the public sometimes evidences itself in small ways. It is
not uncommon for newspapers, especially those with radio
stations of their own, to omit or give incomplete listings of
television and radio programs.6 4  Approximately one third
of all commercial radio stations in the United States have
newspaper affiliation.6 5 The percentage has remained al-
most constant over the last few years although radio outlets'
have rapidly gained in number.6 6  In at least one hundred
communities, the only newspaper also owns the only radio
station. 67 The Federal Communications Commission has not
been unconcerned over the rush of newspapers into the radio
field.6 8 While the charge has been made that the Commission
has shown a vacillating policy with respect to applications
for stations by newspapers, 69 two newspaper applicants for
FM stations were turned down for the sake of diversity in
formity: A Study of Two Competing Dailies, 25 JOURNALISM Q. 127,
129 (June 1948), states with respect to two newspapers in Pottsville,
Pa.: "Both papers printed out-of-town radio programs free (Phila-
delphia, New York), but had an agreement not to oblige any local station
similarly. One station was built and the agreement was kept. A second
began operation, with alleged financial backing from the Journal's large
department store advertiser; the Journal soon after began free publica-
tion of both stations' programs. The Republican stuck to its policy and
printed none."
63. Variety, April 21, 1948, p. 26. The Cleveland Press has been
reported to have refused FM listings. Edit. & Pub., July 3, 1948,
p. 18. As to Los Angeles and San Francisco, see WHITE, op. cit. supra
note 59, at 123.
64. Until recently, the District of Columbia newspapers would not
carry television program logs as a public service, and they were noting
only highlights on local FM schedules. Variety, April 7, 1948. The pro-
grams of small local stations in Washington, D.C. meet the same fate.
Two of the leading newspapers in the District have been major radio
station owners and operators in the District.
65. Edit. & Pub., March 20, 1948, p. 40. For a listing of newspaper
interests in radio, see WHITE, op. cit. supra note 59, at 238.
66. Edit. & Pub., March 20, 1948, p. 40. See Stewart, Freedom
to Read: Newspapers, 35 SuRVEy GRAPHIc 452 (1946).
67. See COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, op. cit. supra note
3, at 43.
68. Note, 96 U. OF PA. L. REV. 563, 564 (1948); Conrad, Economic
Aspects of Radio Regulation, 34 VA. L. REV. 283, 291-292 (1948).
69. See WHITE, op. cit. supra note 59, at 158 et. seq.
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ownership of media of communication and to ensure compe-
tition.70
Other substantial aspects of monopoly exist in radio.
Before the war, four networks owned over ninety per cent of
all radio nighttime power.7 1 Today, the same four networks
dominate the air. The National Broadcasting System and
Columbia Broadcasting System, by setting up artists service
booking agencies, have a substantial hold on available radio
talent.7M A few years ago, over three fourths of the authorized
FM stations were owned by or affiliated with AM stations.
73
Even without attendant restraints, a monopoly status of this
sort is a cause for concern.
However, radio has not been the home of "benevolent"
monopoly.74 Restraints have been many and widespread.75
The Federal Communications Commission, after an extended
investigation, issued a report in 1941 which catalogued many
restraints, banned a number, curbed others and commented
upon still more.7 6  At the time of the Commission's report
70. In re W. B. N. X. Broadcasting Co., Inc., 16 U. S. L. Week
2221, Oct. 21, 1947, noted, 96 U. OF PA. L. REV. 563 (1948). See Scripps
Howard Radio, Inc., 4 PIKE & FISCHER (RADIO REGULATION) 525 (1948);
Times Publishing Co., 4 PIKE & FISCHER (RADIO REGULATION) 603
(1948). In Plains Radio Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Commun. Comm'n,
175 F.2d 359, 363 (C. A. D. C. 1949), the Court held that the Commis-
sion could not give weight to the fact that the applicant for a license
was the owner of the town's only newspaper and ignore the relation-
ship of the other applicant to several newspapers and radio stations
in the same general section of the country. The court said: "A con-
centration of news dissemination by a chain of stations over an area
would seem to us to be a factor in a comparative evaluation from the
standpoint of competition in news dissemination."
71. Ernst, Why Not a First Freedom Treaty, 35 SuRvEy GRAPHIC
445, 446 (1946). In 1946, it was said that there were 730 radio stations
gathered into four networks. Fly, Freedom to Hear: Radio, 35 SURVEY
GRAPHIC 474, 475 (1946).
72. See WHITE, op. cit. supra note 59, at 40. The Federal Com-
munications Commission has viewed this control with concern. See
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 24-25.
73. ERNST, op. cit. note 2, at 131.
74. "We find that it is against the public interest for networks
to operate stations in areas where the facilities are so few or so un-
equal that competition is substantially restricted." FEDERAL COMMUNI-
CATIONS COM IIISSION, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING, 68 (1941). See
also, THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RE-
SPONSIBLE PRESS, 86 (1947).
75. See ERNST, op. cit. supra note 2, Ch. V.
76. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, op. cit. supra note 2.
These included:
1. One-sided, long-term affiliation contracts.
2. Agreements by which local stations would make their
facilities available to only one network: exclusively.
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there were forty-five cities of more than 50,000 population
to which Mutual could not obtain any access because of the
major networks' exclusive contracts. (As a result, many
persons were unable to hear the broadcast of the World
Series of 1939.) It was not only of the World Series that
John Q. Public was deprived. In addition the people of
Buffalo were deprived of a public service program. The
Mutual stations in Buffalo decided not to carry the program
and because of the "territorial exclusivity" provision an in-
dependent station was unable to carry it.7
It has been asserted that the networks have restrained
the expansion of FM facilities, and have permitted their
affiliates to broadcast regular network programs over FM
only on condition that they broadcast substantially all such
programs. In addition, networks adopted a policy of giving
away FM advertising time free to AM advertisers .7 A
broadcasters' Code, never an important force in radio broad-
casting, has at times been used to restrict the access of vari-
ous groups to radio broadcasting.
7 9
The antitrust laws have been expressly made applicable
to radio communication, 80 with power given the Commission
to revoke licenses for violation of the clause. The C6mmission
has given much attention to problems of restraint and mo-
nopoly,81 stating in a report that it had the duty "to refuse
3. Options on time of local stations held by national net-
works.
4. Territorial exclusivity.
5. Contracts designed to discourage local commercial pro-
grams.
6. Network control over station rates.
77. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 200
(1943).
78. 13 Consumers Reports 140 (1948). The same article refers to
delay on the part of AM stations in FM construction under permits
granted them, and proposed rates of A. T. & T., closely aligned with
AM networks, fixed so high as to discourage FM operation. And see
Variety, June 2, 1948, p. 22.
79. See WHITE, op. cit. supra note 59 at 74 et seq.; ERNST, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 142 et seq. As to a more current status of the Code,
see Variety, Sept. 22, 1948, pp. 21, 34. Its tendency toward pre-censor-
ship has been noted with concern. See In Re United Broadcasting Co.,
10 F. C. C. 515 (1945).
80. 48 Stat. 1087, 47 U. S. C. § 313 (1940).
81. As to restrictions on number of stations in single ownership or
affiliation in particular areas, see FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COM-
MISSION, op. cit. supra note 2, at 92; ERNST, op. cit. supra, note 2, at
47, 125 et seq. The Commission has a rule that a license will not be
granted or renewed to stations owning or controlling a site particularly
suited for FM or television when such station has refused to make a
portion of it available to other licensees who have no comparable site
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licenses or renewals to any person who is engaged or pro-
poses to engage in practices which will prevent either him-
self or other licensees or both from making the fullest use
of radio facilities."' 82 Said the Commission: "The prohibi-
tions of the Sherman Act apply to broadcasting. This Com-
mission, although not charged with the duty of enforcing
that law, should administer its regulatory powers with
respect to broadcasting in the light of the purpose which
the Sherman Act was designed to achieve."8 3  The Supreme
Court, when the Commission's action was challenged, re-
jected the contention that the Commission was attempting
to administer the Sherman Act as well as the contention
available and when exclusive use would unduly restrict competition in
a given area. F. C. C. RULES AND REGULATIONS, §§ 3.239, 3.639. There
has been a good deal of controversy over networks representing affiliates
in the sale of national spot advertising. See Variety, March 9, 1949, p.
28.
82. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190,
224 (1943). When the Commission considered applying this yardstick
to television applicants who had violated the antitrust laws in the motion
picture field, Fox and Paramount, in March 1949 challenged the Com-
mission's position. Paramount's Memorandum in Support of Applica-
tions to Renew Licenses of Subsidiaries of Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
argued that the Commission did not have power to consider antitrust
violations in other fields. It was also urged that as a matter of discre-
tion the licenses should not be withheld.
Aside from the question whether the Federal Communications Act
gives the Commission this power, precedents are not lacking where a
government agency, in administering the statute under which it acts, has
taken into consideration violations of other laws by one seeking or op-
posing action by the agency. See 86 I. C. C. 796, 801-802. Agencies in
charge of issuing building permits under wartime regulations took into
consideration the antitrust history of motion picture theatre applicants.
Antitrust consent judgments have been admitted in evidence in other
cases as background material. Perelman v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 95
F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1938), cert. denied 305 U. S. 610 (1938); Tivoli
Realty, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 80 F.'Supp. 800 (D. Del. 1948).
The proclivities of antitrust defendants are an important consideration
in framing antitrust judgments. See McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co.,
93 L. Ed. 457, 460 (1949). And in the trial of United States v. Para-
mount, 334 U. S. 131 (1948), frequent resort was had to other antitrust
litigation in which the defendants had been involved, while one of the
consent judgments finally entered in the case, has part of the relief con-
ditioned upon the result of a private antitrust suit in Chicago. CCH
TRADE REG. SERv. 62,337.
In Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 324 U. S. 570, 572 (1945),
the Supreme Court remarked that certain of the disputed relief might
depend upon Hartford's antitrust history since the date of the appealed
trial court's judgment. By consent, the final judgment entered in that
case contains provisions relating to plastics, a field not included in the
complaint. On the other hand, it was held that OPA violations could
not be used to revoke federal alcohol permits. Trenton Beverage Co. v.
Berkshire, 151 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1945); Billik v. Berkshire, 154 F.2d
493 (2d Cir. 1946).
83. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 223
(1943).
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that the First Amendment was violated. That court has
stated that the "Act recognizes that the field of free broad-
casting is one of free competition. '84
In this field, as in that of the press, the right to know
suffers from the concentration of voices. 85  Of restraints and
monopoly within its own family radio is mute.
TELEVISION
A comparative newcomer in the field of communications,
television has already been charged with a wide variety of
activities which, if true, would seem to be a matter of anti-
trust concern.8 6 One antitrust suit brought by the Federal
Government involving patents 7 has resulted in a consent
84. Commission v. Sanders Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 474 (1940).
A less ready acceptance of this principle is found in Federal Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. American Broadcasting, Inc., 167 F.2d 349 (2d
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 69 Sup Ct. '43 (1948), where a temporary in-junction against two networks was denied. They had refused to deal
with WSAY in Rochester unless that station took an affiliation contract
allowing them to fix rates to advertisers. No sufficient concert of
action was found, but in addition, Judge Augustus Hand remarked that
it was more practicable for a network to operate on a standard advertis-
ing rate.
85. "The mechanism of free speech can operate freely only when
the control of public access to means for the dissemination of news
and issues are in as many responsible ownerships as possible and each
exercises its own independent judgment." In the Matter of Radio Corp.
of America, 10 F. C. C. 212, 213 (1943). Different rules as to use of
radio facilities may obtain where monopoly or dominance exist than
where such status is absent. In McIntire v. Win. Penn Broadcasting
Co., 151 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U. S. 779 (1946), a
complaint charged the defendant radio station had terminated contracts
with a religious corporation and refused plaintiff the right to bid for
radio time on a competitive basis, although defendant had entered into
contracts with other religious broadcasters. The court held there was
no cause of action under the antitrust laws in the absence of allega-
tions that defendant was in a dominant position or a member of a
chain so monopolizing broadcasting as to render it impossible for plain-
tiff to find other outlets, and where neither conspiracy nor concert of
action was alleged.
86. For early restraints in this field, see ERNST, OJp. cit. supra note
2, at 167. In 1948 it was felt that shortage of available television chan-
nels might cause a concentration of television stations into a few net-
works. See Variety, April 14, 1948, p. 27. Some members of the tele-
vision industry have been reported to have called for block booking of
films by television stations, The Film Daily, April 22, 1948, p. 1., a
practice recently condemned in the motion picture industry, see infra
page 535. In 1948, the Authors League of America formed a television
committee as the first step toward establishing a standard policy of
licensing rather than selling material in all writing fields. It was said
representatives from Dramatists, Authors, Radio Writers and Screen
Writers Guilds probably would form an overall committee on censorship
with the four affiliated Guilds of the Authors League. Variety, May 26,
1948, p. 26. As to a Television Production Code similar to that which
exists in the motion picture industry, see, Variety, July 13, 1949.
87. United States v. Scophony Corporation, 333 U. S. 795 (1948).
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judgment."" And the use of television facilities by baseball
clubs has led to a holding that there was sufficient inter-
state commerce involved to give federal courts jurisdiction
under the Sherman Act. 9 In the early part of this year,
the Federal Communications Commission initiated an investi-
gation into practices of American Telephone and Telegraph
Company, upon a complaint that it was refusing to inter-
connect its facilities with non-owned microwave relay links.9
That there has been pressure on customer as well as affiliated
stations to use network television facilities seems probable. 91
Members of the motion picture industry have shown
considerable interest in becoming television operators, as
have radio operators.2 Since motion picture distributors
are likely to become a major source of television entertain-
ment, 8 some caution might well be exercised on the part of
the Federal Communications Commission in considering ap-
plications from motion picture companiesY9 Major motion
88. United States v. Scophony Corp. CCH TRADE REG. SERV. 62,356
(S. D. N. Y. Civ. Action No. 34-184 1949).
89. Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
90. 14 FED. REG. 1068, March 9, 1949. And see Variety, March 2,
1949; The Washington (D. C.) Post, Feb. 13, 1949, p. 10 M.
91. Last year it was reported: "CBS radio affiliates that go tele-
vision, it was also revealed, are bound to align themselves with the
same network under the terms of their AM agreements. The network
inserted in its standard affiliate contract about five years ago a clause
covering that very contingency." Variety, March 31, 1948, p. 30.
The pressure is on from both NBC and CBS for accounts that want
to use or stay on their respective New York outlets, WNBT and
WCBS-TV, to go network. NBC refuses to accept any new video
business that hasn't immediate intentions of becoming a hookup
customer, while the management of CBS' tele-operations is under
express orders from William S. Paley to underscore the network
pitch with all current or prospective WCBS-TV advertisers .... As
a result of Paley's orders Gulf Oil, which carries a news show on
WCBS-TV has been advised that it is expected to go network
within the next four weeks .... An account which NBC recently
turned down because of that advertiser's non-network disposition is
now dickering with WCBS-TV.
Variety, April 28, 1948, p. 31. See Variety, June 2, 1948, p. 18, as to
broadcasters' agreeing not to allow theatres to televise political con-
ventions.
92. Edit. & Pub., Feb. 26, 1949, p. 75. Some NBC affiliates have
been said to be worried about R.C.A.'s control over the network, whereby,
they believe, R.C.A.'s interest in television patents and equipment is
translated into heightening NBC's interest in television to the detriment
of radio. See Variety, March 2, 1949, pp. 25, 38.
93. See The Film Daily, April 5, 1949, pp. 1, 3.
94. Favoring of their own and other distributors' theatres to the
detriment of other exhibitors was demonstrated in United States v.
Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131 (1948). It would seem that there
would be a strong temptation to do likewise with respect to films offered
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picture distributors who have been affiliated with large
exhibitor circuits have shown a more marked reluctance to
furnish films to television than those without such outlets. 95
Up to the date of this writing, motion picture distributors
generally have preferred not to make available current
feature films to television in order to protect theatre owners
from the competition which might otherwise exist.96 Motion
picture exhibitors have exerted considerable pressure upon
motion picture distributors to keep the latter from supplying
television with film product of the kind they themselves wish
to exhibit. 7  Although the fact that television cannot yet
afford to provide motion picture distributors with revenues
equivalent to what they receive from motion picture ex-
hibitors may be a legitimate consideiration, group action of
the sort, designed to restrict television competition with mo-
tion picture exhibition, would seem to fall within the anti-
trust laws.
About one-third of the Federal Communications Com-
mission's television authorization and application have been
originating from newspapers, 98 by far the largest group
interested in television operation. 9 Newspaper ownership
of television stations creates a situation of power and self
interest likely to develop along antitrust lines. 00
for television where both were under single-control. The converse might
also be true where motion picture exhibitor and television station are
under the same control. Competition for films in such a situation is
likely to be attenuated. At least one Commissioner is said to have ex-
pressed his opinion that no stigma was attached to motion picture
theatre applicants for television licenses. The Independent Film Journal,
March 26, 1949, p. 11. Earlier remarks by the same Commissioner seem
inconsistent. See Motion Picture Herald, Feb. 5, 1949.
95. See list of pictures made available to television for a two week
period in March, 1949. The Independent Film Journal, March 26, 1949,
p. 11.
In answer to a stockholder's query about making films for tele-
vision, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer's Vice President is reported to have said:
"We make our living in presenting pictures in theatres. We own 131
houses and cater to about 15,000 others. If we encourage people to
stay home, we won't have them in the theatres." The Film Daily, March
28, 1949, pp. 1, 10.
96. One distributor, when approached by television stations, is
quoted as saying, "Our first concern is for 35 mm. theatrical release."
The Independent Film Journal, March 26, 1949, p. 12.
97. While sometimes a matter of individual protest, quite frequently
pressure is applied through local or national exhibitor associations. See
The Film Daily, Jan. 31, 1949, pp. 1, 4; The Film Daily, April 6, 1949,
pp. 1, 7.
98. See Variety, March 2, 1949.
99. See Edit. & Pub., Feb. 26, 1949, p. 75.
100. It has been said that actors do not dare to refuse television
interview programs on newspaper owned stations for fear of adverse
or no notice of their act in news columns. See Variety, Aug. 25, 1948.
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In order to avoid concentration of control, the Federal
Communications Commission has restricted television owner-
ship to five stations, °0' in line with a comparable ceiling on
radio stations. A Commission ruling that two radio licenses
and a television permit might be sold in one package, over
the objection of an applicant who was interested only in
television, would seem to have lessened the force of this
regulation. 10 2
MOTION PICTURES
The -motion picture industry in the United States is a
fabulous empire of sound and sight. Millions are attracted
to its magic. In other countries, it is an unofficial ambas-
sador of the United States. In this country, it is the leading
form of entertainment and an important medium for the
conveyance of ideas. 10 3  Motion pictures have recently been
placed in the preferred company of speech and press. 04 This
empire has had a phenomenal growth. It has been an empire
in which shoestrings were often mushroomed into substantial
bank accounts, in which great power was an attainable am-
bition, and in which a common front against lesser members
of the industry was recognized as a profitable method of
doing business. The right to know is seriously hampered by
a non-competitive screen.
Perhaps, because of its history, this industry has been
rife with monopoly and restraints of unparalleled frequency
and scope on the part of the major elements of the industry
against those not within the limited hierarchy,05 often under
101. 47 CODE FED. REG. 3.640 (Supp. 1945). For other regula-
tions designed to prevent monopoly and restraints in this field, see 47
CODE FED. REG. 3.631-3.640 (Supp. 1945).
.102. Re Dorothy S. Thackery, F. C. C. Docket No. 2284, criticized,
97 U. Op PA. L. REv. 571 (1949).
103. "The motion picture industry, next to the church and school,
touches our people most intimately." Perelman v. Warner Bros. Pictures,
9 F. Supp. 729, 730 (E. D. Pa. 1935), aff'd, 95 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1938),
cert. denied, 305 U. S. 610 (1938).
104. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 166
(1948).
105. The Federal government has been embroiled with the industry
in over fifteen antitrust suits as well as in several Federal Trade Com-
mission proceedings. In most of them, judgment has been entered
against the defendants. For many years, the eight major companies
have had an annual average of about forty private antitrust suits
pending against them, and for the most part have regarded such suits
as a normal expense of operation. See also Brady, The PBblems of
Monopoly, 254 ANNALS 125, 133-134 (1947). McDonough, Jr. and
Winslow, The Picture Industry: United States v. Oligopoly, 1 STANF. L.
REV. 385 (1949).
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the guise of "self-regulation." The earliest antitrust suit
brought by the Federal Government against the industry's
leaders was against monopoly control in the form of a com-
bination of patent holders. 1° 6 The Government, in its brief
in the Paramount case, referred to the adverse public effects
of monopoly in a medium of expression and education of
importance in controlling the thought and action of the
American people. 0 7  It was asserted that the First Amend-
ment furnished an argument for the application of the Sher-
man Act.10 8  The Supreme Court's opinion in that case
recognizes that monopoly in this medium may call for appli-
cation of the First Amendment,19 although it did not deem
the case before it to require resort to the Constitution. The
concern of the courts with monopoly and restraints in this
medium of communication has grown as the industry's
growth and influence have advanced."10
At present, eight companies are the dominant factors in
the production and distribution of motion pictures. They
have very substantial control over the former, and even
greater control over the latter. Five of them have controlled
the majority of the important first run motion picture
theatres in the country. The monopoly power of this kind
of integration is tremendous. Moreover, that power is fre-
quently exercised to exclude or restrain competitors and to
106. United States v. Motion Picture Patents Co., 225 Fed. 800, 802
(E. D. Pa. 1915).
107. Government brief pp. 122-126, United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U. S. 131 (1948). It was argued that, "The content
of films, regardless of who produces them, or exhibits them, must
necessarily be conditioned to some extent by the prejudices and moral
attitudes of those who control the channels of distribution. Only by
assurance that the distribution field is equally open to all may the
fullest diversity of film content be had."
108. Id. pp. 125-126. In the brief for the American Civil Liberties
Union, as Amicus Curiae, filed in the Paramount case, supra
it was argued that the monopoly power of the Big Eight had abridged
the constitutional right of the public to freely receive communications.
An equally comprehensive argument on this point was proffered in the
brief for the Society of Independent Producers as Amicus Curiae filed
in the Supreme Court in the same case, pp. 10, et seq. Cf. Brady, The
Problems of Monopoly, supra note 105,, 133 (1947).
, 109. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 166
(1948).
110. Paramount Famous Corp. v. United States, 282 U. S. 30 (1930);
White Bear Theatre Corp. v. State Theatre Corp., 129 F.2d 600 (8th
Cir. 1942); Milliam Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 150 F.2d 738(3d Cir. 1945), cert. deinied, 68 Sup. Ct. 1016 (1948); United States v.
Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 229, 241 (W. D. N. Y. 1945),
modif., 68 Sup. Ct. 947 (1948).
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deny to the public the benefits of a competitive system.111
Control over distribution and the more lucrative theatres by
the eight majors has made it difficult for pictures of inde-
pendent producers to get adequate distribution and exhibi-
tion, since they must distribute through their competitors
and compete with them for playing time in their theatres. 112
The right of the public to see has also been restricted by the
reluctance, often expressed in contract, of the eight majors
to distribute and exhibit pictures from other countries. 13
And the large chains have, at times, denied to the public
the right to see pictures of their choice.1 4 Block booking of
111. See Brady, The Problem of Monopoly, 254 ANNALS 125 (1947) ;
Inglis, Freedom to See and Hear: Movies, 35 SURVEY GRAPHIc 477, 480(1946); ERNST, op. cit. supra note 2, Ch. VI; HUETTIG, ECONOMIC CON-
TROL: MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY, (1944); Rostow, The New Sherwn
Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 567,
589 et seq. (1947); The Motion Picture Industry, A Pattern of Control(TNEC Monograph 43). Among the recent cases illustrating this
monopoly power and its improper exercise are Goldman Theatres, Inc.
v. Loew's, Inc., 150 F.2d 738 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 68 Sup. Ct.
1016 (1948) (Philadelphia); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327
U. S. 25 (1946) (Chicago); Theatre Inv. Co. v. RKO Radio Pictures,
72 F. Supp. 650 (W. D. Wash. 1947) (Seattle). A leading case decided
some nine years ago involved part of Texas, Interstate Circuit v.
United States, 306 U. S. 208 (1939). How the public fares because of
the monopoly power of this integration was highlighted by the testi-
mony of the President of RKO, as a witness in United States v. Para-
mount 334 U. S. 131 (1948), Rec. 1622: "In the first place if you have an
unsuccessful picture, your first-run outlets that you control let it get
into the flow of distribution and that is very important, because if you
have an unsuccessful picture and your first-run exhibitor has no re-
sponsibility to you, you are foreclosed from that whole territory if you
fail to get it into first-run theatres."
112. See Vitagraph, Inc. v. Perelman, 95 F.2d 142, 145-146 (3d Cir.1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 610 (1938); brief for The Society of
Independent Motion Picture Producers as Amicus Curiae, p. 3, United
States v. Paramount, 334 U. S. 131 (1948), brief of American Civil
Liberties Union in same case, pp. 15-16; brief of government in same
case, p. 11. See Nelson, The Independent Producer, 254 ANNALS 49,
55-56 (1947).
113. See Inglis, supra note 111, at 481; United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc. 66 F. Supp. 323, 352 (S. D. N. Y. 1945) aff'd, 334 U. S.
131 (1948). The advent of Rank, the English Producer, as a very large
chain exhibitor in foreign countries where American producers dis-
tribute their pictures has led to more English pictures being shown in
this country, recently, but Rank has continued to complain of the type
of distribution he gets.
114. In United States v. Paramount, 334 U. S. 131, 166 (1948), the
Supreme Court thought monopoly in the motion picture field at the
production end might involve consideration of the First Amendment,
but not at the exhibition end. The Court's distinction seems premised
upon a lack of knowledge of the actualities in this industry.
Even in the absence of integration, the public in large areas may
be deprived of a right to see, when a large chain exhibitor, having
monopolies in a number of towns, decides not to take any of -the
pictures of a distributor for a season. This was true in United States
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motion pictures has had the effect of compelling the ex-
hibitor to take the poor pictures along with the good. That
practice by the major distributors has been outlawed re-
cently by the Supreme Court."'
It has been customary in the industry to channel the
early showings of pictures into the large downtown theatres,
then for an extended period not to play the picture in any
theatre in the city, and after such period to begin playing
the picture in neighborhood theatres. This system, known
as the clearance system, has been applied to the showing of
news events as well. A great deal of the independent ex-
hibitors' complaints has been levied against "unreasonable
clearance." In addition, the larger circuits of theatres were
licensed to exhibit early runs, while the "independent"
theatres were either denied such license or were bound by
such terms as prevented effective competition. This has
been especially true of theatre circuits affiliated with the
major distributors.116
Exhibitors, circuit or independent, have not been free
from antitrust taint.1 117  In many areas of the country ex-
hibitor motion picture chains have not only monopoly power,
but customarily engage in practices of monopoly and re-
straints.1 18 They have banded together to oppose building
v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173 (1943); Schine Chain
Theatres v. United States, 334 U. S. 110 (1948). See as to the Skouras
Circuit shutting out Paramount pictures for more than a year because
of a dispute over terms for pictures, Variety, May 5, 1948, p. 5.
The record in the Paramount case showed that Paramount pictures
were not played for a considerable period in any New York City
neighborhood houses because of Paramount's prefeience to deal with
Loew despite inability to arrive at acceptable terms for an inordinate
length of time. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. (S. D.
N. Y. 1949) CCH, TRADE REG. SERV. 1 62,473.
115. See United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U. S. 131(1948); Hearings before Committee on Interstate Commerce on Block
Booking and Blind Selling in Motion Pictures on S. 3012, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1936). See McDonough, Jr. and Winslow supra note 105.
116. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131 (1948).
117. Federal courts have found the requisite interstate trade and
commerce under the Sherman Act when confronted with restraints on
the exhibition of motion pictures in particular localities. Binderup v.
Pathe Exchange, 263 U. S. 291 (1923); Goldman Theatres, Inc. v.
Loew's, Inc., 150 F.2d 738 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 68 Sup. Ct. 1016(1948). Some state courts, despite a plethora of federal cases to the
contrary, have refused to find trade and commerce, Paramor Theatre
Co. v. Trade Commission, 95 Utah 354, 81 P.2d 639 (1938).
118. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173(1943); Schine Chain Theatres v. United States, 334 U. S. 110 (1948).
Their monopoly rested upon the support of eight major companies in
the industry,
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of new theatres by would-be competitors ;:"" and with the
distributors they have gone to considerable lengths to pre-
vent 16 millimeter films being made available in competition
to standard 35 millimeter exhibition.120
The larger exhibitor chains have also shown a marked
sensitivity to pressure groups; thus, at times, denying to
the public the opportunity of seeing a picture which not
only some segments of the public might desire to see, but
which has had the approbation of many critics.21 The
Catholic War Veterans put on an organized pressure cam-
paign to keep "Monsieur Verdoux" from playing in New
York because they did not like the political views and non-
citizenship of the star, Charles Chaplin. Loew, one of the
two most important movie chains in the New York metro-
politan area, pulled the picture after a very short run.2 2  A
group called Sons of Liberty Boycott Committee spon-
sored boycotts of British films because of resentment against
the British attitude toward Palestine. These boycotts
prevented the showing of a number of British pictures in
some localities.
119. See Box Office, Sept. 13, 1947; Variety, Feb. 4, 1948, pp. 7,
18.
120. See The Film Daily, April 5, 1949, pp. 1, 7; Motion Picture
Herald, April 9, 1949, p. 38.
121. Charles Chaplin's, "Monsieur Verdoux," is reported to have
had the phenomenally low record of less than 1,000 playdates in the
first year of its release. "Difficulty has resulted mainly from inability
of United Artists, the distribs, to line up circuit bookings for the film.
It has played no major chains at all, except for a few houses. As a
matfer of fact, it was on this score that Chaplin urged UA execs
recently to bring suit on a charge that the circuits were 'conspiring to
keep the film off the screen." Variety, April 7, 1948, pp. 3, 22. Much
of the opposition to the picture seems to have been the result of an
emotional bias against Mr. Chaplin for leftist views he is supposed to
possess. Id. .1
In Washington, D.C., the picture was first booked -to play in a
downtown first run Loew's theatre. When it appeared that the picture
would play at the same time as that of a hearing of the TUn-American
Activities Committee, Loew's found reasons for not playing the picture.
The picture was then played simultaneously at the neighborhood theatres
of one particular chain. It never had a downtown run. ,,
The economic effect on a picture which does not play the houses
of the major chains is directly related not only to the absence of book-
ings in the larger, most lucrative houses, but also the lack of benefit
of advertising exploitation which accompanies the playing of a picture
in these first run theatres.
122. It is disputed as to whether Loew's pulled the picture because
of this pressure or for some other reason, but it would seem that Loew
was not unaffected in its decision by such organized hostility. See PM,
Nov. 26, 1947, p. 13. Variety, Jan. 21, 1948. In Jersey City, N.J., the
Catholic War Veterans threw a picket line around the theatre playing
the picture. PM., supra.
537
INDIANA LAW JouRNAL
While various self-regulatory bodies have been held in
violation of the antitrust laws,123 one powerful body has
received little complaint from exhibitors. This body, The
Production Code Administration, has arrogated to itself the
primary determination of what the public shall see. The
Administration 124 was set up by the major producers and
distributors as part of the Motion Picture Association.125
The Motion Picture Production Code came into being in 1930
as did the Advertising Code. 2 6  They are administered by
the Production Code Administration127 and the Advertising
Code Administration, within the framework of the Motion
Picture Association. 28 At first voluntary, since October of
1931 member companies have to submit copies of all scripts.
In addition, books, plays, lyrics of songs, titles, as well as
films before and after printing, must be passed upon by this
123. These include Boards of Trade, Grievance Boards, Clearance
Boards, Arbitration. United States v. First Nat. Pictures, Inc., 282
U. S. 44 (1930); Paramount Famous Corp. v. United States, 282 U. S.
30 (1930); Youngelaus v. Omaha Film Board of Trade, 60 F.2d 538(D. Neb. 1932). See Bertrand, The Motion Picture Industry, N. R. A.
Work Materials, No. 34, Industry Studies Section (1936); Brady, The
Problem of Monopoly, 254 ANNALS 125, 130 (1946).
124. Perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of the history and
operation of the Production Code Administration is found in INGLIS,
FREEDOM OF THE MOVIES, Chs. 3-5, inclusive (1947). See also, Note,
Censorship of Motion Pictures, 47 YALE L. J. 87, 102 et seq. (1939).
As to movie censorship at the governmental level, see CHAFFEE, FREE
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES, 540 et seq. (1941); ERNST & LINDSEY,
THE CENSOR MARCHES ON, (1945).
125. The association itself in regulating the industry has been a
breeder of the type of concerted action with which the antitrust laws
are concerned. See Brady, The Problem of Monopoly, 254 ANNALS 125,
129 et seq. (1947). This is the successor to the Motion Picture Pro-
ducers and Distributors of America which originated in 1922, with Will
H. Hays as director. INGLIS, FREEDOM OF THE MOVIES, 87 et seq. (1947).
Inglis states that the alter ego of this organization is the Association
of Motion Picture Producers, Inc., with which it has a very close
operating arrangement. The membership of both associations is com-
prised of the top executives of the large movie companies. This Asso-
ciation has a much larger scope of activity than precensorship of movies.
126. Shurlock, The Motion Picture Production Code, 254 ANNALS
140 (1947). There were earlier private pressure groups which worked
with the industry. One of some importance, the National Board of
Review, still exists. INGLIS, op. cit. supra, note 125, at 74. A long list
of private review committees is found in The Film Daily, May 31, 1949,
pp. 1, 6.
127. Its English counterpart, the British Board of Film Censors,
was established in 1913. INGLIS, op. cit. supra note 125, at 73.
128. They work in conjunction with studio censorship departments
of member companies. See Luraschi, Censorship at Home and Abroad,
254 ANNALS 147 (1947).
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organization to obtain its Code Seal of Approval. 129 Not
only must member companies have their pictures passed upon
by the Production Code Administration, but also non-mem-
bers who use the distribution or exhibition facilities of mem-
bers. 30 Foreign pictures distributed in member theatres
likewise must be approved by the Production Code Admin-
istration. There appears to have been considerable effort
to keep the penal provisions of the Code out of the light of
publicity.'31 In fact, the Code has provided for a $25,000
fine for producing,, distributing or exhibiting a picture lack-
ing the Production Code Administration's approval.a32 Since
March 30, 1942, the fine has been made inapplicable to ex-
hibition, 32 although member companies having theatres are
still pledged to maintain the Production Code policies. Per-
haps as effective a sanction requiring observance of the Code
is the economic power of the major elements as a group. 34
This sort of organizational setup not only invites further
restrictions on each member of the industry because of the
129. ERNST AND LINDSEY, THE CENSOR MARCHES ON, 91 (1940);
Shurlock, The Motion Picture Production Code, 254 ANNALS 140, 142-
144 (1947). It is also said that an Agreement for Uniform Interpreta-
tion requires all advertising copy be submitted to the Association, and
that disapproved copy not be used. INGLIS, op. cit. supra note 125, at
146.
130. One of the administrators of the Code has estimated that over
95 per cent of all motion pictures made in the United States are made
with" the cooperation of the Production Code Administration. Shurlock,
The Motion Picture Production Code, 254 ANNALS 140, 142 (1947). The
same source states: "Virtually all producers of foreign-made pictures
to be made in the English language, which are to be exhibited in this
country, also submit both script and finished product." Ibid.
131. Shurlock, a code administrator, in discussing enforcement
avoids any mention of a penal sanction. Shurlock, supra, note 130, at
145.
132. See Inglis, Need for Voluntary Self-Regulation, 254 ANNALS
153-154 (1947).
133. Inglis suggests this modification had its genesis in a fear of
vulnerability to the antitrust laws, INGLIS op cit. supra note 125, at
142; and see Inglis, Need.for Voluntary elf -Regulation, 254 ANNALS
153, 154 (1947).
134. "But the main basis for its observance in the past was the
economic influence of the major producer-distributors over the theatres.
Since the affiliated theatres would not show pictures unless they had
the approval of the Code Administration, almost all the independent
producers routed their pictures through that office as a matter of discre-
tion." The CoMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RE-
SPONSIBLE PRESS, 70 (1947). See also, Inglis, Need for Voluntary Self-
Regulation, 254 ANNALS 153 (1947): "The fact is that the program
was forced on practically the entire industry by a dozen or so powerful
executives in the major companies." Inglis, Freedom to See and Hear:
Movies, 34 SURvEY GRAPHIC 477, 480 (1946).
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fears of or susceptibility to pressure groups of some of the
members,135 but it naturally leads to concerted restrictions
in collateral fields.136 It has an important effect on the shap-
ing of books and plays we read which may be written with
a view to being potential motion picture material. 13 7
While the Code Administration does have a measure of
135. In December of 1947, the Motion Picture Association of America
agreed on substantial changes in the Production Code and the Advertis-
ing Code. No film based upon the life of a notorious criminal may be
approved unless the character is punished for the crimes committed by
him. (Does this mean that it may no longer be suggested on the screen
that Hitler escaped, and what of that kindly knave, Robin Hood?). It
is no secret that under this revision a picture about Capone will not
be shown unless it departs from the truth. At the same time it was
announced that in the future P. C. A. may refuse a Code seal to a
picture determined by it to be "objectionable." "Objectionable" is not
defined.
Only slightly less vague is a modification of Section XI of the Code
forbidding, "Titles which suggest or are currently associated in the
public mind with material, characters or occupations unsuitable for the
screen." See The Film Daily, December 4, 1947, pp. 1, 8; Id. December
5, 1947; The Independent Film Journal, December 6, 1947, p. 16. An
immediate result of these changes was the elimination of more than
25 titles of pictures released between 1928-1947 from the Title Registra-
tion List. Included are such titles as "The Killers" and "The Racket-
eer." These changes were accompanied by a statement from Eric
Johnston, M. P. A. A. President, that, "The action by the board of di-
rectors is further evidence of the determination of our members to
utilize our self-regulatory machinery to the fullest to assure decency
and good taste in motion pictures, titles and advertising." Trade press
comments give point to the economic significance of the Code: "Hence-
forth, the Production Code seal, a virtual requisite for the successful
release of a feature in the U. S ....... The Film Daily, December 4,
1947, pp. 1, 8.
136. According to INGLIS, op. cit. supra note 125, at 149, the Ad-
vertising Code Administration and the Production Code Administration
cooperate to prevent advertising in pictures. See Variety, April 28,
1948, p. 9, for an illustration of such action. Inglis also states that,
"In order that the public may not confuse the advertising of the sex-
circuit theatres with that of members of the Association, there are un-
written agreements or informal arrangements with many newspapers
that unsuitable motion picture advertising will not be accepted." In
1924, the Association is said to have adopted what came to be known
as the Formula, a resolution, "to prevent the prevalent type of picture;
to exercise every possible care that only books or plays which are of
the right type are used for screen presentation." In 1927, 'an agree-
ment was made with the Authors League of America whereby books or
plays which were unacceptable for screen presentation in their original
form could be accepted if they were re-written so as to be made un-
objectionable." INGLIS, pp. 112-113. See also Shurlock, The Motion
Picture Production Code, 254 ANNALS 140 (1947); ERNST, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 25, states that as the result of conspiracy of the major
motion picture companies, authors of manuscripts submitted to one
company and rejected by the Hays office can find no ready market
place to reach a movie audience.
137. Original stories, of course, are even more strongly affected.
INGLIS, op. cit. supra note 125, at 153.
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popular appeal 138 and possibly has dulled government cen-
sorship, it suffers from an ailment common to group activity.
The common denominator of its approach to life and thought
is the average of the group, and more inclined to be below
than above that average.139 It substitutes the subjective and
objective judgment of the group for the subjective and ob-
jective judgment of the individual. In the realm of the
subjective, it denies the right of the individual to use his
own judgment. The Code contains many taboos which must
not be created at all or only in a limited manner. As to some
of these taboos, many might disagree, or might think they
could be best exorcised and dealt with by treatment on the
screen.140 The Code and the Code Administration have often
been charged with stifling the full realization of this means
of communication as an educator, entertainer, and conveyor
of ideas.'4, This organization and its Code, as part of the
Motion Picture Association, have restricted trade and com-
merce in all the multitude of fields that go into the produc-
138. Inglis, while critical of the monopoly and restraints attendant
upon the codes and their administration, favors this sort of self-regula-
tion on a broader, more representative scale. Inglis, Need for Voluntary
Self-Regulation, 254 ANNALS 153, 156-159 (1947)- INGLIS, op. cit. supra
note 125, at 74. Cf., Luraschi, Censorship at Home and Abroad, 254
ANNALS 147 (1947). The 1948 national convention of the Daughters
of the American Revolution responded to changes in the Production
Code, the Advertising Code and Title Registration by passing a resolu-
tion congratulating the President of the Motion Picture Association of
America and presidents of member companies, "for the industry's
action in strengthening its system of self-regulation covering picture
content, titles and advertising in order to develop fine motion picture
entertainment in Anmerica." Washington (D. C.) Evening Star, April
21, 1948, p. 1. See Shurlock, The Motion Picture Production Code, 254
ANNALS 140, 145-146 (1947) ; Quigley, Importance of the Entertainment
Film, 254 ANNALS 65, 67 (1947). Quigley played an important part in
the framing of the Code; Luraschi and Shurlock have worked with and
for the Production Code Administration, respectively. The Director
of the Code has been both praised and criticised for his administration.
INGLIS, FREEDOM OF THE MOVIES, 152 (1947); Note, Censorship of Motion
Pictures, 47 YAL L. J. 106 (1939). For an interesting debate upon
self-imposed movie censorship, see Saturday Review of Literature, Feb.
26, March 2, April 30, 1949.
139. See Note, Censorship of Motion Pictures, 47 YALE L. J. 87, 106-
107 (1939); cf. WHITE, THE AMERICAN RADIO, 72 (1947) as to the
effect of a broadcasters' code.
140. The taboos include miscegenation, white slavery, sex hygiene,
ministers of religion as villians, illegal drug traffic. One of the gen-
eral principles of the Code reads: "Correct standards of life, subject
only to requirements of drama and entertainment shall be presented."
The Production Code Administration is said to have been responsible
for shelving projected films such as Sinclair Lewis', "It Can't Happen
Here." ERNST AND LINDSEY, THE CENSOR MARCHES ON, 91 (1940).
141. See INGLIS, op. cit. supra note 125, at 128. Adherence to
precedents of interpretation of practice undoubtedly makes it difficult
to achieve much flexibility in the Code's administration. See Shurlock,
The Motion Picture Production Code, 254 ANNALS 140, 142 (1947).
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tion, distribution and exhibition of pictures. All of this is
done in an atmosphere of anonymity and absence of pub-
licity quite alien to the normal tests by which we judge good
from bad.1 42
The trouble with evaluating what the Production Code
Administration has done in terms of motion pictures re-
leased, is that we are in no position to know what has been
denied the public in pictures not released because of the
Administration's expressed or understood disapproval, un-
attended by publicity.143 It may well be that, unless courts,
from fear of alternative increased government censorship or
from emotional approval of what the Code is doing, find
"reasonableness" in such type of restraint, this organizational
set-up and its activities violate the antitrust laws.1 4 4
Group action by the Production Code Administration
makes each member less inclined to stand on its own feet in
the face of pressure groups even more extreme in what they
would or would not have on the screen-and, in turn, en-
courages the existence and exertions of such groups. 45 The
142. Shurlock, supra note 138, at 140, states that since the Code
Administration "works with a high degree of anonymity little authentic
information concerning its operations ever reaches the general public."
143. Ingrid Bergman was recently quoted: "The insistence of civic
and religious groups on controlling what goes into films has resulted
in a serious obstacle in creating stories for the screen. Hollywood is
afraid to do anything in a creative vein that suggests reality. The
Production Code (The Johnston office) demands that punishment for
any deviation from set behavior by a character be made perfectly clear
in a screen play. The Legion of Decency imposes its will on every
picture even before it can be formed in the writer's mind. Lesser groups,
too, have weakening effects on all screen stories. The result is that
pictures have achieved a deadly sameness." The Washington (D. C.)
Post, April 5, 1948, p. 10. Richard S. Coe, movie critic, reporting
this statement of Miss Bergman's, goes on to say: "That she can
hold her tongue, too, is evident in her care not to refer to one of the
Legion of Decency's latest rulings-in Metro's forthcoming 'The
Three Musketeers,' Cardinal Richelieu, a sinister fellow in the
Dumas classic, will become a Protestant. The Roman Catholic group
wouldn't give its approval of the role." See also Blanshard, Roman
Clthoeio Censorship, 166 NATION 499 (1948), commenting upon other
historical distortions on the screen induced by pressure from these
groups. Life Magazine, Oct. 25, 1948, pp. 67-68. See also Washington
(D. C.) Post, Nov. 6, 1948, p. 4, on script changes required by the
Code Administration.
144. ERNST AND LINDSEY, THE CENSOR MARCHES ON, 91 (1940),
note that the Federal Government, when drafting its complaint against
the major members of the industry in United States v. Paramount, 334
U. S. 131 (1948), considered adding allegations based upon the Code as
evidencing monopolistic combination.
145. Compare, Shurlock, The Motion Picture Production Code, 254
ANNALS 140, 143 (1947): "In addition to other duties, P. C. A. mem-
bers must keep abreast of public reactions to pictures showing cur-
rently, and be cognizant of present trends of the various pressure groups.
These observations they share with the producer." To the same effect,
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most powerful of these fringe groups is the National Legion
of Decency.146  It came into being in 1934. Through the
weapon of organized boycott, the Legion has exerted direct
pressure on motion picture producers, distributors and ex-
hibitors to prevent showing of pictures it deems unfit. While
it operates primarily at the exhibition end, it has been
credited with being a primary factor in bringing about the
Production Code Administration. Catholics were circularized
to sign a pledge to remain away from movies except those
which do not offend "decency and Christian morality," and
to secure as many members as possible for the Legion of
Decency. The Legion publishes a weekly list of ratings for
pictures. 47  In some cities the Legion's campaign has "in-,
eluded picketing motion picture theatres.
4 8
If we may believe the press, the Legion of Decency can
and does exert an economic power in respect to what we may
see, which inevitably has a serious effect on interstate com-
merce. 4  Economic pressure of this sort has been par-
ticularly prevalent and effective in Philadelphia.' It has
see Metzger, Pressure Groups and the Motion Picture Industry, 254
ANNALS 110, 111 (1947).
146. This is a Catholic organization. Parallel Protestant and Jewish
organizations have and do exist but they have never been as agressive
and as influential as the Legion of Decency. Cf. Metzger, Pressur e
Groups and the Motion Picture Industry, 254 ANNALS 110, 111-112
(1947); INGLs, op. cit. supra note 125, at 120 et seq. But see Variety,
Sept. 21, 1949, pp. 1, 26. As to similar activities by the Legion of
Decency in other fields, such as birth :control and magazines, see ERNST
AND LINDSEy, op. cit. supra note 140, at 216, 245.
147. A critical analysis of their ratings appears in Blanshard,
Roman Catholic Censorship, 166 NATION" 499 (1948). Thus, "Gentle-
men's Agreement" and "Miracle on 34th Street" are said to have re-
ceived objectionable ratings because of a divorcee being the heroine,
Blanshard, supra, at 500.
148. The-Legion's less agressive counterpart in England, the
Catholic Film Society of England reportedly conferred with the Legion
to effect a liason between the two. Variety, December 14, 1947, p."16.
149. "Halt of double features in some localities loom as a result of
a barrage on film companies by individual members of the Legion of
Decency around the country. . . . Mail received here indicates its a
concerted drive with letters worded alike from far flung sections of the
country. One studio received a bunch from Maine and another bunch
from Missouri, all commencing, 'I feel bound in conscience to conform
to ideals of the Legion of Decency by refusing to attend theatres where
an unobjectionable film is being shown with an objectionable film ... ' ."
Studios are turning the matter over to the Motion Picture Ass'n.
Variety, December 31, 1947. See Life, May 16, 1949, pp. 97-100. At
the Hearings on Block Booking and Blind Selling, supra note 115, the
Executive Secretary of this organization stated, pp. 472-473: "The
Bishop's Committee . . . is exclusively authorized to dictate the policies
and practices to be followed by the Catholic people of the United States
in the campaign for wholesome pictures."
150. Cardinal Doughtery is said to have threatened a year's boycott
of Philadelphia theatres venturing to show "The Outlaw" and "Forever
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operated nationally to impede the showing of the picture
"Mom and Dad," which deals with matters of sex. 151 It is
alleged to have forced changes in "Black Narcissus" because
the picture reflected on convent life.1 52 An abject apology by
the President of Twentieth Century Fox for having opposed
the Legion of Decency's attempts to impede the showing of
"Forever Amber" further attests to the economic power of
the Legion.153  A church group, of course, has a right to
express its views of a picture. It may be doubted, however,
that because its motive is morality, it is entitled to use
economic sanction to enforce such views. The right to per-
suade is not the right to coerce or boycott.154 It often has
been held, and even more often reiterated, that benevolent
motives are not a defense to an antitrust suit. 55  Yet, what
we find on an increasing scale in the motion picture industry,
is a system of private courts regulating an industry.
Amber," Blanshard, Roman Catholic Censorship, 166 NATION 499, 501
(1948).
151. See Variety, January 28, 1948, pp. 3, 20. Persons associated
with the exploitation of this picture assert it has educational and social
value. They have considered the possibility of antitrust action. And
it has been reported that they have filed a complaint with the Federal
Trade Commission against the Legion of Decency, charging a restraint
of trade. The Film Daily, May 10, 1948, pp. 1, 9. In New Jersey, a
restraining order was granted against the carrying out by city officials
of a threat to revoke the license of a theatre if it showed the picture.
Hygienic Productions v. Keenan, 62 A.2d 151 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1948).
152. Blanshard, supr, note 147, at 499. Blanshard points out that
the Legion's attitude is influenced by denominational considerations as
well as those of morality.
153. According to Variety, January 28, 1948, pp. 3, 28, the apology
was a condition to the Legion of Decency's further negotiations with
Fox as to modifications of "Forever Amber." Other examples of
obeisance to the Legion are said to have occurred with respect to the
pictures "Mom and Dad" and "Volpone."
154. In Paramount Pictures v. United Motion Pictures T. C., 93
F.2d 714 (3d Cir. 1937), a group of exhibitors believed they were being
unfairly treated by Paramount. Through an association, they decided
to take drastic concerted action to get better terms. Picketing was first
decided upon, but abandoned. It was decided to refrain from dealing
with Paramount and to use "lawful" persuasion against other exhibitors
by reciting their grievances against Paramount. Paramount, for once
the plaintiff in an antitrust suit, sought an injunction. The court held
this concerted action was an unlawful boycott in restraint of trade,
"even though the restraint is produced by means of peaceful persuasion."
In People v. Masiello, 177 Misc. 608, 615, 31 N. Y. S.2d 512, 520 (Sup.
Ct. N. Y. Co. 1941), newsdealers concertedly boycotted 7 newspapers to
get better terms. Picketing was resorted to. In granting an injunction
the court said: "Even peaceful picketing may not be resorted to for
the purpose of aiding and furthering a conspiracy to restrain trade in
violation of a penal statute such as the Donnelly Act."
155. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20, 49(1912) ; United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 406 (7th
Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 618 (1941), and see cases cited infra,
next three footnotes.
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Vigilantism, practiced in a business suit is no more com-
patible with our system of a government of laws and not of
men than when practiced in a hood or riding clothes.156 In
the earliest antitrust case in this field, the defendants argued
that it was their purpose to improve the art and protect the
morals of the public. They claimed credit for censorship
which they said had been neglected by government authori-
ties. This apology was held no defense to the suit. 57  Since
that time, the courts have repeatedly taken a similar posi-
tion.58
156. In American Medical Ass'n. v. United States, 130 F.2d 233,
249 (App. D. C. 1942), aff'd, 317 U. S. 519 (1943), the Court said:
"Appellants are not law enforcement agencies; they are charged with
no duties of investigating or prosecuting, to say nothing of convicting
and punishing. They have been given no power to require their mem-
bers, or Group Health Association, to reveal the intimate details of
their affairs, as was attempted in the present case. Except for their
size, their prestige, and their otherwise commendable activities, their
conduct in the present case differs not at all from that of any other
extra-governmental agency which assumes power to challenge alleged
wrongdoing by taking the law into its own hands. Although extreme
situations may seem sometimes to have required vigilante action where
effective law enforcement by duly constituted officers had broken down
or never been established; and although persons who reason super-
ficially concerning such matters may find justification for extra-legal
action to secure what seems to them desirable ends, this is not the
American way of life."
157. United States v. Motion Picture Patents Co., 225 Fed. 800,
808 (E. D. Pa. 1915). "'. . . the law is its own measure of right and
wrong,' as well as the judge of whether a transaction is of the char-
acter which it condemns."
158. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States,
234 U. S. 600, 613 (1914); Paramount Famous Corp. v. United States,
282 U. S. 30, 43, 44 (1930); United States v. First National Pictures,
Inc., 282 U. S. 44 (1930). In Fashion Guild v. Trade Commission, 312
U. S. 457, 468 (1941), the Court said, "even if copying were an acknowl-
edged tort under tthe law of every state, that situation would not justify
petitioners in combining together to regulate and restrain interstate
commerce in violation of federal law." United States v. General
Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642, 649 (S. D. N. Y. 1944) (claim of
same purpose as tariff acts); Manaka v. Monterey Sardine Industries,
Inc., 41 F. Supp. 531 (N. D. Cal. 1941) (purpose alleged: conservation
of important food fish by regulating prices and manner of taking fish).
United States v. Alexander & Reid Co., 280 Fed. 924 (S. D. N. Y. 1922)(use of private courts [committee of an association] before which con-
tractors charged with owing money to members were to appear, held
bad). Federal Trade Commission v. Wallace, 75 F.2d 733 (8th Cir.
1935) (Coal Dealers Association attempted to pressure producers not
to deal with non-members by a wide variety of means, including dis-
paraging statements). One of the defenses was that defendant's activi-
ties were designed to abet the NRA Code by bringing about prosecution
of coal dealers who shortweighted, over-charged, and misrepresented
their coal. The court said; "It is not a prerogative of private parties
to act as self-constituted censors of business ethics, to install themselves
as judges and guardians of the public welfare, and to enforce by drastic
and restrictive measures their conceptions thus formed." Federal Trade
Commission v. Wallace, supra at 737.
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Despite the cases supporting the previous statements,
where economic self-aggrandizement is not the obvious pri-
mary motive, and the primary motive is one which the judge
is in sympathy with, one should not be too rudely surprised
to find some court suddenly emphasizing motives.159 The
danger of entertaining motive as a test of antitrust liability
is heightened by the encouragement it gives to all sorts of
groups to try to use group action to impose their will upon
the rest of the public by restricting exploitation of a
picture. 16 0
CONCLUSION
No more than other fields is that of communication free
from restraints and monopoly. New forms continue to take
the place of older methods. The danger of government con-
trol or regulation to a free dissemination of ideas and infor-
mation is probably well realized by the public. But strangely
enough, it is likely that government agencies enforcing the
antitrust laws or acting in conformity with such laws, will
continue to be guardians of "a right to know."
159. In Hughes Tool Co. v. Motion Picture Ass'n, 66 F. Supp. 1006
(S. D. N. Y. 1946), the plaintiff sought an injunction pendente lite
to restrain defendants from revoking a seal of approval. A combina-
tion and conspiracy was alleged to coerce film producers to use the
Production Administration, thus causing them to avoid controversial
film treatment of social, political and economic matters in contravention
of the First Amendment and the Sherman Act. The controversy actually
had to do with risqu6 advertising of "The Outlaw."
The court denied the injunction on a number of grounds. One
ground was the motive of the defendants. It said that the fact that
the defendants' members had agreed not to release, distribute, or pro-
mote the release or distribution of an unapproved picture was not a
violation of the Sherman Act. "The purpose of the approval is in
furtherance of the proper purpose of the defendants to censor pictures
which it may consider are not up to the highest moral and artistic
standards. Defendants, I believe, owe that duty to the public." Hughes
Tool Co. v. Motion Picture Ass'n, supra, at 1013. This approach reveals
an attitude toward the Sherman Act which would emasculate it. The
Act denies to a group the right to determine what shall and shall not
go into interstate commerce, and what the public shall receive in the
course of that commerce. Its philosophy is that competition gives the
public the best opportunity to get the best and that self-regulation is
the antithesis of competition. The judge who decided this case has
shown a tendency to restrict the scope of the Sherman Act. See
Shuster v. New Syndicate Co. (S. . N. Y. 1943), CCH TRADE REG. SERV.
1 52.921; United States v. Paramount Pictures, 66 F. Supp. 323 (S. D.
N. Y. 1946), modif., 334 U. S. 131 (1948).
160. Recently, the board of directors of the Allied Independent
Theatre Owners of Iowa and Nebraska passed a resolution asking its
325 members not to show the movie, "The Senator was Indiscreet," be-
cause it was "a reflection on the integrity of every duly elected repre-
sentative of the American people" and, "The picture could be used as
vicious propaganda by subversive elements in this nation as well as by
our enemies abroad." The Independent, January 17, 1948, p. 23.
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